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2
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4
5 Affiliation: 1Department of Psychology, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, UK
6
7 Abstract: 
8
9 Despite important similarities having been found between human and animal 
10 communication systems, surprisingly little research effort has focussed on whether 
11 the cognitive mechanisms underpinning these behaviours are also similar. In 
12 particular, it is highly debated whether signal production is the result of reflexive 
13 processes, or can be characterised as intentional. Here, we critically evaluate the 
14 criteria that are used to identify signals produced with different degrees of 
15 intentionality, and discuss recent attempts to apply these criteria to the vocal, 
16 gestural, and multimodal communicative signals of great apes and more distantly 
17 related species. Finally, we outline the necessary research tools, such as 
18 physiologically validated measures of arousal, and empirical evidence that we 
19 believe would propel this debate forward and help unravel the evolutionary origins of 
20 human intentional communication.
21
22
23 Keywords: Intentional communication, signal production, vocalisations, gestures, 
24 language evolution
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25 Introduction 
26
27 The evolution of language remains one of the biggest unsolved puzzles in 
28 human origins. The complexity of human language far exceeds the complexity seen 
29 in the communication systems of any other extant primate species. However, we 
30 dont know nearly enough about the cognitive underpinnings of non-human 
31 communication to determine what changed in our early hominin ancestors. Because 
32 behaviour does not fossilise, it is imperative to look to the behaviour of other species 
33 and take a comparative approach in the study of language evolution. In recent 
34 decades, a growing focus on communication in non-human great apes, monkeys, 
35 and more distantly related species has started to reveal a variety of shared abilities. 
36 The study of animal behaviour has a long history of considering non-human 
37 species as automatons, machines that take input from their surroundings and 
38 automatically produce an output. Sensory input enters the black box, and behaviour 
39 comes out. For many research purposes that is an entirely adequate approach, but 
40 in comparative psychology the question should be what is happening inside the 
41 black box? (1). In order to understand the evolution of language, researchers must 
42 ask questions about the cognitive abilities involved in other species communication. 
43 This is a real challenge, and hence many animal communication studies focus on 
44 describing the signals and signal sequences that are produced on a purely 
45 behavioural level. One danger of this approach is that behaviour in non-humans and 
46 humans can appear similar, but if the surface similarity in behaviour is underpinned 
47 by very different cognitive processes, then they may not tell us much about how 
48 human language evolved (2). We need to start to scratch beneath the surface and 
49 ask questions about the cognition that underpins signal production. One of the first 
50 questions that arises when we start to look deeper is whether signals are produced 
51 intentionally in non-humans. 
52 Human language is intentional  we do not produce sentences as automatic 
53 responses to stimuli, rather we intend to alter the behaviour or mental state of other 
54 individuals (3,4). Intentionality is a difficult concept to define and operationalise, and 
55 researchers studying gestural, vocal, and facial signals have tackled this challenge in 
56 different ways. So we start this review paper by offering some definitions of 
57 intentional signal production and outlining the criteria that are most commonly used 
58 to identify intentional communication in other species. We then give an overview of 
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59 evidence for intentional communication in non-human primates and other more 
60 distantly related species. Next, we critique current approaches to assessing 
61 intentional communication discussing (i) the inconsistency in the application of 
62 intentionality criteria; and (ii) the validity of the criteria themselves. Finally we 
63 suggest future directions for research, including the need for physiologically 
64 validated behavioural measures for arousal, and the potential benefits of refocussing 
65 attention back on experimental assessments of second-order intentionality. 
66 Traditionally, researchers across different species and different communication 
67 systems have tended to tackle similar problems from different angles. We aim to 
68 bring together approaches from research on vocalisations, gestures, and facial 
69 expressions, across a number of species, and propose ways forward for the study of 
70 intentionality in non-human communication. 
71
72 Defining intentional communication
73
74 To begin with, we have the problem of defining intentional communication in a 
75 way that can be operationalised and tested in non-verbal species. Varying definitions 
76 of intentional signal production have hindered the progression of our knowledge in 
77 this domain. The term intentionality originated in philosophy, introduced by Franz 
78 Brentano, referring to puzzles of representation, linking together the philosophies of 
79 mind and language (5). Brentano believed that intentionality was a prevalent 
80 property in all mental states, from beliefs and hopes to love and hatred, with these 
81 always being about or referring to a specific target, property, or matter of fact (real or 
82 imagined). Notably Brentanos thesis suggested that intentionality is only a mental 
83 phenomenon, and cannot exist in non-mental constructs such as sentences of 
84 natural languages. However, Searle (6) and Grice (4,7) reinterpreted intentionality as 
85 it might apply to actions and communication, moving it beyond Brentanos original 
86 formulation. Grices early conceptualisations of intentional signalling require 
87 sophisticated meta-representation from both the recipient and the signaller (4,7,8). 
88 He proposed that when producing an intentional signal, it is explicitly clear that the 
89 signaller is communicating something to the recipient (also known as ostension), and 
90 the fact that the signal is communicative is mutually understood by both participants 
91 (7,8). That this is ubiquitous in (adult) human communication is uncontroversial, but it 
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92 is debated to what extent non-linguistic communication systems can be deemed 
93 intentional based upon Gricean views (2,9).
94 Questions have recently been raised about the appropriateness of using 
95 Gricean intentionality and meaning as a way of assessing non-human 
96 communication, given that Grices definitions were rooted in linguistics rather than 
97 including any form of expressive communication (10,11). However the Gricean 
98 approach remains the dominant approach in animal communication, with most 
99 researchers using Dennetts intentionality framework (4) which offers more graded 
100 steps towards the complex meta-representation required for full-blown Gricean 
101 intentional communication. According to this framework, zero-order intentionality 
102 requires no mentality involved in signalling, whilst first-order requires that the 
103 signaller intends to signal in order to change the behaviour of the recipient, and 
104 second-order requires that intentions to signal are combined with mental state 
105 attributions (12). Using food calls as an example, zero-order intentional 
106 communication would be that the signaller calls on arrival at a food patch as a result 
107 of increased arousal or excitement triggered by food discovery. For first-order 
108 intentional communication, the signaller would call to affect their audiences 
109 behaviour, i.e. to recruit group members to join the signaller at the food patch. 
110 Finally, for second-order intentional communication, the signaller would call to inform 
111 ignorant audience members about the food patch, thus altering their mental state 
112 from ignorant to knowledgeable. 
113 Because Dennetts framework offers tractable definitions for differing levels of 
114 intentionality, that can be operationalised, it has found popularity among animal 
115 communication researchers (1214). Focussing on first-order intentionality (altering 
116 of behaviour) loosens previously strict criteria for mental state understanding, and 
117 offers a valuable stepping stone from no intention to higher levels of intention. 
118 However, many researchers still believe that second-order intentionality (requiring 
119 attribution of mental states) is the most relevant cognitive precursor to the evolution 
120 of language.  Both lab and field experiments have been designed to try and identify 
121 second-order vocal production in primates, where researchers have tested whether 
122 the knowledge state of the audience mediates call production in the signaller (15,16). 
123 However, before second-order intentional signal production is tackled, the first logical 
124 step seems to be to distinguish first-order from zero-order intentional signal 
125 production. This approach has been recently advocated (9,12), particularly as 
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126 children can struggle with high-order meta-representations (17), yet do not struggle 
127 with language, and communication in adults does not always rely on such high-order 
128 representations (18). In order to identify first-order intentional signal production a 
129 clear framework with observable behavioural criteria is required. 
130 Townsend et al. provide such a framework (12), bringing together markers 
131 that have previously been used to identify first-order intentional communication in 
132 prelinguistic humans and non-human animals. They propose that an animal has 
133 communicated with first order-intentionality if the following three conditions are met: 
134 i) a signaller acts with a goal when communicating to a recipient; ii) the signaller 
135 exhibits volitional control over recipient-directed signal production to obtain their 
136 communicative goal; and iii) that the recipient alters their behaviour in a way that is in 
137 line with the signallers goal. The value of this framework lies in its ability to define 
138 the intentionality of a signal using directly observable behaviour. The main limitation 
139 of the framework is that, as highlighted in the original paper and discussed in more 
140 depth later in this article, all the b havioural markers designed to diagnose first-order 
141 intentional signal production could also be explained by zero-order intentional 
142 processes. Thus the validity of the criteria used is unclear. In order to meaningfully 
143 discuss the validity and use of the criteria, we will first outline the criteria and the 
144 empirical evidence currently used to claim first-order intentionality in different 
145 communicative modalities. 
146 To test Townsend et al.s first criterion that signals are produced to meet a 
147 goal, the signaller should continue to signal until a stopping rule has been satisfied 
148 and the goal met. That is, when a recipient does not respond to a signal immediately, 
149 the signaller should persist or elaborate in signalling in pursuit of their goal. In such a 
150 case, the recipient response that terminates these communicative attempts can be 
151 identified as the putative goal of the initial signal (1921). 
152 A broader range of behaviours centred on social use of a signal are 
153 suggested to help identify the production of volitional and recipient-directed signals 
154 (criterion (ii)). The most rudimentary marker concerning social-usage is the presence 
155 or absence of potential recipients. While humans sometimes produce signals in 
156 private, for non-humans, signals that are produced in the absence of an audience 
157 are presumed to be a product of underlying arousal-based mechanisms. For 
158 instance, if a monkey sees a snake and produces an alarm call when no other 
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159 monkeys are around, it is assumed that the signal was produced as a result of 
160 elevated arousal or fear triggered by predator discovery. 
161 Building from the simple presence of a potential recipient, researchers also 
162 search for complex audience effects, where the composition of the audience can 
163 mediate both the rate and structure of signals. For instance, vervet monkeys alarm 
164 call more frequently in the presence of kin than non-kin (22), and chimpanzees alter 
165 the structure of their victim screams given to severe aggression if high ranking 
166 bystanders are in the audience (23). These more complex audience effects show 
167 selective control over signal production, indicating that they are voluntarily produced 
168 and directed at specific recipients. 
169 Decisions regarding when and what type of signal to produce can also be 
170 affected by the attentional state of the recipient(s). Visual signals produced to 
171 inattentive recipients are likely to be ineffective, because the recipient cannot see the 
172 signal. If the signaller intends to communicate to the recipient, they should produce a 
173 signal that is perceptible to the recipient  avoiding silent-visual signals when the 
174 recipient is inattentive and relying on audible or tactile signals in these 
175 circumstances. This selectivity indicates not only that the signaller may be engaging 
176 in basic perspective taking, but also that they understand the most effective means 
177 by which to achieve their goal. Before selecting the appropriate signal, the signaller 
178 should check where the recipient is looking, and then continue to visually monitor the 
179 recipient for a response. Together these behaviours are commonly known as 
180 audience checking, which is a frequently used marker of first-order intentional 
181 communication, as it seems to indicate that the signaller is directing the signals at a 
182 recipient and then expecting a response.  
183 The final criterion shifts focus from signal production, instead requiring a 
184 consistent behavioural response from the recipient that is appropriate for the signal 
185 given (e.g. moving away from the perceived threat that elicited the signallers alarm 
186 calls). The recipient response needs to be consistent across multiple signalling 
187 events, and needs to occur immediately after a signal more frequently than at other 
188 times (chance level of response behaviour occurring), in order to show that the 
189 response is connected to the signal. This criterion is important to demonstrate that 
190 signals are effective, and that recipients seem to understand the signal or the 
191 signallers goal in some manner. 
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192 To date, studies have focused on identifying behavioural indicators of 
193 intentionality (e.g. persistence, gaze alternation or social usage) without reaching a 
194 consensus on how these should be applied in methodology. Surprisingly, there is no 
195 established acceptable number of behavioural indicators required to classify a signal 
196 as intentional (24). The definition offered by Townsend et al. likewise does not 
197 specify this (12), but instead requires that a signal demonstrates at least one 
198 behaviour from each of the three broader criteria in order to be deemed intentional. 
199 Defining intentionality in these terms has the benefit of being conservative enough to 
200 avoid claims for intentionality with only one behavioural indicator, and at the same 
201 time is still empirically viable and inclusive across taxa. 
202
203 Primate Evidence 
204
205 Traditionally, primate vocalisations, gestures, and facial expressions have 
206 been studied in isolation with researchers specialising in just one of these types of 
207 communication (17, but see 18), and perhaps as a result have followed different 
208 approaches to looking at intentionality. Gesture researchers have been the most 
209 explicit in their treatment of intentional communication. Intentional gestures were first 
210 observed in captive chimpanzees (27,28), and have now been observed in all four 
211 species of non-human great apes (Table 1). Following this early work on 
212 chimpanzees, intentional production has been routinely used as a prerequisite for a 
213 body movement to be identified as a gesture. As it is difficult to define the onset and 
214 offset of gestures based on physical properties, researchers used intentional 
215 production as a way to differentiate communicative movements from non-
216 communicative movements that are produced for other purposes. This is in stark 
217 contrast to vocal and facial signals which are defined in terms of their physical 
218 properties, with the degree of intentionality underpinning a signal a matter for 
219 separate investigation. Claims of intentionality in gestures are therefore rather 
220 circular, as gesture researchers are a-priori selectively focussing on body 
221 movements that appear intentional and therefore it is not surprising that these 
222 signals go on to meet behavioural markers for intentionality. 
223 To be classified as a gesture, some of the following behavioural criteria must 
224 be met: it should be directed towards a specific recipient, the signaller should check 
225 the attention of the recipient and adjust their signal to match that attention, signallers 
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226 should wait for a response, and if they do not receive a response they should 
227 continue to produce more signals (2932). These criteria originate from early 
228 attempts to identify intentional gesture production in preverbal human infants (33), 
229 and attempt to distinguish first-order from zero-order intentional signal production. 
230 Different researchers require different numbers of criteria to be met before assigning 
231 intentionality to the signal or class of signals in question (Table 1), but it is widely 
232 claimed that great ape gestures are produced with first-order intentionality. 
233 In contrast, vocalisations have traditionally been viewed as automatic, zero-
234 order intentional signals elicited by specific environmental events (e.g. presence of a 
235 predator (34)). It is only in recent years that markers of first-order intentionality have 
236 been applied to vocal behaviour to challenge this stance (Table 1). On the other 
237 hand, experiments testing second-order intentional signal production have only been 
238 conducted in the vocal domain, not in the gestural domain. Capitalising on the fact 
239 that in many species alarm calls function to refer to predators, experiments have 
240 been designed to test whether alarm calls are produced selectively to ignorant group 
241 members, to change their mental state from ignorant to knowledgeable. Whilst 
242 captive macaques do not mediate their alarm or food calls as a function of their 
243 offsprings knowledge about a predator or food source (15), more promising results 
244 suggest that wild chimpanzees may be more likely to alarm call to individuals who 
245 know less about an ambush predator model (16). There is mounting evidence that 
246 both gestures and (some) vocalisations meet behavioural criteria for first-order 
247 intentionality, and that some may even show evidence of second order intentionality 
248 (35). 
249 Of the three types of communication, facial expressions have received the 
250 least attention from researchers in terms of their intentional production. The 
251 traditional view of facial expressions is that they are zero-order intentional signals 
252 that are the product of emotional processes. However, although humans produce 
253 facial expressions automatically, we can also produce them intentionally, and so it is 
254 important to ask whether other primates share this ability. Hopkins et al. argue that 
255 chimpanzees have some volitional control over their facial expressions (36), and 
256 more recent studies have demonstrated that great apes modify their facial 
257 expressions if their audience is visually attending to them (37,38). More research is, 
258 however, needed to determine whether facial expressions meet other intentionality 
259 criteria.
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260
261 -Table 1-
262
263 Intentional signal production in other species
264
265 Although most research has focussed on intentional signal production in non-
266 human primates, other species have also been the subject of investigation. 
267 Identifying intentional communication in species more distantly related to humans is 
268 important, as it may help us to understand the selection pressures that give rise to 
269 intentional control over communicative signals, as well as helping us to evaluate the 
270 validity and utility of the behavioural criteria being used to identify first-order 
271 intentional signal production. 
272 Social usage of signals, the first of the behavioural markers that is said to 
273 indicate voluntary control and recipient-directed signal production, is widespread in 
274 the animal kingdom. For instance, seminal work on audience effects demonstrated 
275 that female ground squirrels produce more alarm calls in the presence of direct kin 
276 as opposed to non-kin (39). Similarly, male domestic chickens were found to 
277 increase the frequency of food calls when a female was present compared to when 
278 they were alone (40), and male Siamese fighting fish produce fewer aggressive 
279 signals towards other males, when there is a female audience (41). In fruit flies, the 
280 genotypic composition of the social group significantly impacts the overall levels of 
281 pheromone signal production, as well as when chemical signals are produced 
282 (42,43). Such findings show that complex audience effects are found across taxa, 
283 with signals being affected not just by the presence of an audience, but by that 
284 audiences composition. We therefore need to question whether volitional control 
285 over signal production is in fact widespread in the animal kingdom, or whether 
286 audience effects are not strong markers of volitional control. 
287 Miklosi and colleagues (34), move away from basic audience effects and 
288 argue that dogs produce intentional showing signals to human owners to indicate 
289 the location of a hidden toy. Showing was defined as a communicative action 
290 involving both a directional pointing component (head orientation towards the 
291 hidden toy) and an attention-getting component (barking and gazing at owner). 
292 When the dogs observed an experimenter hiding a toy in one of three inaccessible 
293 locations in the room, and the naïve owner then entered, the dogs exhibited gaze 
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294 alternation between the owner and hidden toy and attention getting behaviours, 
295 significantly more than when they were simply in the room with the owner in the 
296 absence of a hidden toy. While the authors claim that this demonstrates intentional 
297 referential communication, more evidence is required to confirm the intentional 
298 nature of these signals, certainly according to the Townsend et al. framework (12). 
299 Similar claims of intentional showing behaviour have been made for ravens. 
300 Pika and Bugnyar argue that ravens show objects to conspecific partners (44). 
301 Showing is defined as picking up a non-food item, holding it up in the beak, head 
302 straight or tilted upwards, and staying in this position (pg. 2; 44). They report that 
303 such showing gestures were always recipient-directed, and produced at a 
304 significantly higher frequency to attending than non-attending partners, showing 
305 sensitivity to the partners attentional state. The authors claim that these signals 
306 were goal-directed, based on the signaller looking at the recipient and showing 
307 response waiting. However, without subsequent persistence or elaboration in the 
308 face of an unresponsive partner, there would be insufficient evidence to show that 
309 these gestures were produced in a goal-directed manner according to Townsend et 
310 al.s criteria (12). These gestures seemed effective in eliciting a positive response 
311 from recipients, in terms of partners orienting towards the signalling bird or object 
312 and subsequently engaging in affiliative, rather than agonistic behaviour, but chance 
313 levels of these responses within these dyads occurring are unclear. In summary, 
314 although this showing behaviour seems under voluntary control and is recipient-
315 directed, more evidence is needed before the other criteria of goal-directed 
316 production and consistent recipient responses can be confirmed. On the surface, 
317 there seem to be commonalities between this showing behaviour in ravens and 
318 courtship displays involving objects in a variety of avian species, so future research 
319 could usefully apply the intentionality criteria to such displays in non-corvids to see 
320 whether other avian species demonstrate first-order intentional signal production. 
321 In terms of satisfying all three of the intentionality criteria for signal production 
322 proposed by Townsend et al. (12), perhaps surprisingly, some of the strongest 
323 candidates are two species of fish. Grouper fish and coral trout perform a 
324 headstand to signal the location of prey to cooperative hunting partners, and this is 
325 considered to be referential communication (45). This signal meets the main criteria 
326 for intentional signalling, including being seemingly goal-directed (showing 
327 persistence, elaboration, and cessation when goal is met), recipient-directed, and 
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328 eliciting a response from the recipient that is in line with the goal. It is one of the few 
329 empirical demonstrations that meets all of the intentionality criteria set by Townsend 
330 et al.  in a single communication system (12), providing more solid evidence than 
331 most primate species to date. More recently, convincing evidence of intentional 
332 communication has also been found in Arabian babblers (46), and it is likely that the 
333 wider application of Townsend et al.s criteria will reveal more intentional 
334 communication across a broader range of species.
335 These studies suggest that a diverse range of species deploy some form of 
336 intentional signalling and that intentional signal production may not be restricted to 
337 large-brained mammals. It is therefore unclear whether first-order intentional signal 
338 production is simply widespread in the animal kingdom, or whether different 
339 processes are underpinning the same behavioural patterns in different taxa. Given 
340 that the behavioural markers are designed to probe specific underlying cognitive 
341 processes, the validity of these measures is questioned if we attempt to explain 
342 away the findings of first-order int ntional signalling in distantly related, relatively 
343 small-brained animals by claiming that they might be the product of different 
344 underlying processes. The findings of first-order intentional signal production in 
345 distantly related species provide insights into the types of problems and pressures 
346 that drove intentional communication to evolve, but they also call into question the 
347 importance of first-order signal production as a stepping stone in the evolution of 
348 human language.
349
350 Current Limitations 
351
352 Our understanding of intentional communication in non-humans is currently 
353 limited by two main issues: (i) the diversity of evidence used to claim intentional 
354 signal production and consequent lack of comparability between studies, and more 
355 importantly, (ii) the validity of the behavioural criteria used to distinguish first-order 
356 from zero-order intentional communication. For those who consider the current 
357 criteria to be valid, or the best tools currently available, the lack of rigorous 
358 application of these criteria across studies remains problematic, and this issue will be 
359 addressed first.
360
361 Lack of consistency in application of intentionality criteria
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362
363 The claim of intentional signal production can be based on highly variable 
364 types and amounts of data. As Table 1 shows, the number of criteria examined is 
365 very inconsistent across studies; some studies only require 1/3 or 1/4 criteria to be 
366 met to count as an intentional signal, while other studies require that 1/1 or 3/3 
367 criteria are met. Some variation should be expected, as not all criteria are relevant to 
368 each species (e.g. a standard 1-2s response waiting period that was designed 
369 around chimpanzee data may be too short or too long for other primate species) or 
370 modality (several criteria are specific to visual signals). However, it also seems that 
371 there is additional variability in the stringency with which the behavioural criteria are 
372 used by different researchers before accepting a signal as intentionally produced, 
373 and such variability is problematic. 
374 A better approach may be to use all criteria and list how many signals were 
375 eliminated at each stage: for example, the study started with 400 gesture instances, 
376 but 12 had no audience checking, 23 had no response waiting, and 15 had no 
377 persistence, which left 350 gestures that met all criteria for intentionality. One 
378 problem with this approach is that goal-directedness can often only be tested when 
379 the recipient does not immediately respond and provides the opportunity for the 
380 signaller to persist or elaborate to achieve their goal; so what to do with signals that 
381 elicit an immediate appropriate response is unclear, as we cant use the established 
382 markers for goal-directedness in these cases.
383 There is also an important difference between studies that collect systematic 
384 data to test whether a certain signal or class of signals meet specific criteria for first-
385 order intentionality (e.g. (38,47,48)) and studies, most of them gestural, where 
386 intentional production criteria are used as pre-conditions to screen potential 
387 gestures, so that only body movements that are produced intentionally are 
388 considered in later analysis (e.g (20,21,49)). When systematic data is presented, 
389 there is variation in whether baseline data on the behaviours of interest are 
390 associated with communicative signals at a level significantly above chance. For 
391 instance looking at group members is a common behaviour that, when produced in 
392 temporal association with a signal, we interpret as audience checking, and this is 
393 sometimes used as the sole criterion for identifying first-order intentional signalling 
394 (Table 1). However, we first need to know the chance level of these two behaviours 
395 co-occurring to be able to say that looking at group members really is related to 
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396 signal production. One approach is to statistically compare the likelihood of the 
397 intentional behaviour marker occurring with signal production events and non-signal 
398 production events (e.g. (50)). In cases where inferential statistics are applied to the 
399 data, one can infer that on average, intentionality markers are likely to co-occur with 
400 signals at above chance rates, but it is much harder to interpret purely descriptive 
401 data. For instance, Gruber and Zuberbühler report 9 events where a chimpanzee 
402 vocal signal was repeated in the face of an unresponsive audience 0-13 minutes 
403 after the original call (40). Unfortunately, without comparison to signaller behaviour in 
404 all events with unresponsive and responsive audiences, it is hard to conclude from 
405 these data that chimpanzees generally persist with this call type until they meet their 
406 goal.  
407 When the behavioural criteria for intentional signal production are used as 
408 preconditions to identify true gestures, there is also variability with the number of 
409 criteria that a gesture instance has to meet. Many researchers only require a signal 
410 to meet one of a set of criteria that often includes response waiting, which typically 
411 means that after a signal, no subsequent signals are produced by the signaller for at 
412 least 2 seconds (13 out of 27 papers in Table 1 use response waiting as a criterion, 
413 and 10 out of those 13 studies required no other criteria to be met). Response 
414 waiting can be relevant to identifying intentionality when combined with persistence if 
415 the recipient is unresponsive, but response waiting in isolation (producing a single 
416 signal rather than a sequence of signals) has many explanations, most unrelated to 
417 intentionality. Thus response waiting on its own is not adequate to demonstrate 
418 intentional communication, but often that is exactly what researchers are using.
419 There is also variability in whether each individual signalling event is 
420 assessed against intentionality criteria (20,21,49), or whether one instance of 
421 intentional use of a specific signal by a specific individual is then extrapolated to all 
422 signals of the same type produced by that same individual (30). To summarise, there 
423 is a large amount of variability in the rigour with which researchers ensure their 
424 signals meet the behavioural criteria for intentionality, and whilst some variation is 
425 inevitable, we argue that the current degree of variation makes comparisons across 
426 studies, species, and modalities extremely difficult. 
427 Trying to understand the cognitive processes in the signal producer, with a 
428 view to informing theories of language evolution, is a difficult endeavour and in terms 
429 of examining different signal types produced in different modalities, in different 
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430 contexts, and across species, we have barely scratched the surface. Thus 
431 comparability across studies is really important, as an individual research team can 
432 only make small contributions to this substantial challenge. Even when comparisons 
433 are possible, interpretation of results from different studies can also be challenging. 
434 A prominent example of conflicting interpretations about the same signal 
435 comes from claims of zero- to second-order intentional production made for the 
436 same type of chimpanzee alarm call. These alarm calls, called either soft huus (47) 
437 or alert hoos (16,51), were elicited by snake models presented by two different 
438 research groups. Schel et al. (47), presented wild chimpanzees with a moving 
439 python model, and found that the calls were given in the absence of an audience, 
440 whilst visually fixating on the snake (little audience checking), and with a calling rate 
441 unaffected by the arrival of new potentially ignorant individuals. When considered in 
442 bouts with other types of alarm calls (alarm huus and waa barks), positive evidence 
443 for persistence towards a goal and gaze alternation was found, but the contribution 
444 of soft huus within these mixed call type bouts is unclear. Thus Schel et al. 
445 concluded that soft huus, at least in immediate response to the snake, were best 
446 characterised as zero-order intentional individualistic expressions of fear (47). In 
447 contrast, experiments with the same community of wild chimpanzees using a static 
448 model of a snake, showed that the relative knowledge state of the receivers 
449 mediated the production of alert hoos and the researchers concluded that these calls 
450 were produced with second-order intentionality (16). 
451 It is not at all clear what to make of this pattern of results: the same call type 
452 tested with a snake presentation experiment to the same community of chimpanzees 
453 within the space of a few years, yet despite these commonalities, the data point to 
454 very different conclusions. One way to reconcile these differences is to accept that 
455 there is variability in the degree of intentional control involved in the production of a 
456 signal, depending on the precise context (e.g. species and movement of predator 
457 model). Anecdotally, humans also experience varying degrees of voluntary control 
458 over their signal production. For instance, a normal ability to inhibit swearing in front 
459 of senior colleagues can be lost in a situation of extreme fear, such as almost 
460 crashing a car. If we accept this, however, it indicates that the intentionality of signal 
461 production must be assessed on an event by event basis, and extrapolation of 
462 intentional production of one instance of signal production to another, as is 
463 sometimes done in gesture research (e.g. (30)), is likely inadvisable. These 
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464 conflicting findings demonstrate the value of replication and multiple groups working 
465 on the same questions, but wider discussion of how to make sense of seemingly 
466 contradictory findings such as these is needed. 
467 In conclusion the variability across many dimensions in how the current 
468 behavioural criteria for first order intentionality are applied, means that valid 
469 comparisons across studies and modalities is essentially impossible. If we are to 
470 continue to use these criteria, a more rigorous and uniform approach is required. 
471
472 Validity of the behavioural markers for first-order intentional signal production
473
474 Perhaps the most serious issue that requires attention is the validity of the 
475 behavioural criteria used to identify instances of first-order intentional communication 
476 and distinguish them from zero-order intentional communication. Whilst the 
477 behavioural criteria all make intuitive sense, they are all also open to lower level, 
478 zero-order intentional explanations (12,24), which means they may not be measuring 
479 first-order intentionality at all. First, lets consider goal-directedness as measured by 
480 persistence or elaboration in signalling when faced with an unresponsive recipient or 
481 an inappropriate audience response. It is sometimes easiest to imagine how a 
482 behaviour may be driven by a lower-level mechanism if you imagine an example with 
483 a signal that is assumed to be driven by zero-order intentional processes. Rightly or 
484 wrongly, we have traditionally assumed that primate facial expressions are read-outs 
485 of emotional arousal. In a case where a subordinate chimpanzee is fearful of 
486 approaching a dominant, they may produce a silent bared teeth face and both this 
487 signal and the fearful emotion presumed to underpin it, persist until the dominant 
488 individual reassures the subordinate, at which point the fearful emotion decreases 
489 and the silent bared teeth face disappears. In this scenario, the production of the 
490 silent bared teeth face would meet the criterion for persistence until the goal of 
491 eliciting reassurance from the dominant was met, but it may have been driven by 
492 purely zero-order intentional processes. A high level of emotional arousal may not 
493 only trigger the production of a single signal, but a number of signals that share 
494 similar functions. If a number of closely related signals share a common arousal 
495 based production mechanism, then this could also account for elaboration, where 
496 more than one signal type is used until the goal is achieved. To return to the above 
497 example, the arousal state associated with fear of approaching a dominant may 
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498 trigger submissive crouching behaviour, or pant grunt vocalisations, in addition to the 
499 silent bared teeth facial expression, and this constellation of behaviours would meet 
500 the criteria of elaboration of signals to meet a goal. 
501 There is equal uncertainty as to the mechanisms underpinning the 
502 behavioural criteria for a signal being produced voluntarily and in a recipient-directed 
503 manner. Producing a communicative signal selectively in the presence of an 
504 audience (social use), may be driven by arousal. Research with a range of species 
505 indicates that arousal levels are higher when in a social group compared to alone 
506 (52) and thus it is plausible that in an arousal-based system, the threshold for signal 
507 production is usually only met when an audience is present and base levels of 
508 arousal are elevated. More complex audience effects, such as only producing 
509 signals in the presence of kin, friends, or higher ranking individuals may be more 
510 compelling, but it is also possible that the presence of certain individuals differentially 
511 affects arousal. The evidence for arousal increasing differentially with the presence 
512 of different individuals is less apparent, but this possibility needs testing and ruling 
513 out before we can say with certainty that complex audience effects do not arise from 
514 an arousal based signal production system. Equally, cases where signals are 
515 contingent on the behaviour of the audience (e.g. individual alarm calls until all other 
516 group members have alarm called) could also arise from changes in arousal. In 
517 humans we know that heartrate in a speaker can be increased by negative 
518 behavioural responses in the audience (e.g. (53)) and behaviour in audience 
519 members may affect autonomic arousal levels in signal producers across species. 
520 Sensitivity to the recipients attentional state, in terms of only producing visual 
521 signals when a partner is attending, appears to be a strong marker of intentional 
522 signal production, as it may involve perspective taking, however this behaviour could 
523 also be a result of learned discriminations. Individuals may learn over their lifetime 
524 that the face of a recipient is one of the necessary eliciting stimuli for effective 
525 production of visual signals, possibly in a similar way to infant vervet monkeys 
526 learning to narrow the type of stimuli that elicit their eagle alarm call (24). If this 
527 scenario is correct, then looking for the stimulus of a conspecific face before 
528 signalling (like visual examination of an aerial object in vervet monkeys before alarm 
529 calling) would also result in what has been described as audience checking 
530 behaviour. 
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531 Although audience checking where the signal producer looks at the signal 
532 recipient before or during signal production, may have a low-level conditioning 
533 explanation for visual signals, there doesnt seem to be an obvious lower-level 
534 explanation for why primates should look to audience members before emitting a 
535 vocal signal, as visual attention in the recipients is not necessary for vocal signals to 
536 be effective. 
537 In summary, as has been previously highlighted, each of the criteria has an 
538 alternative zero-order intentional explanation, however the empirical evidence 
539 supporting these alternative explanations is highly variable and many remain simple 
540 theoretical possibilities. It has been previously argued that providing convergent 
541 evidence from diverse markers, provides more robust evidence and more likely 
542 attributable to a single mental ability (intentionality) than a series of arousal and 
543 conditioning based explanations (12,24), and whilst we agree that convergent 
544 evidence across markers is stronger than evidence from a single marker, more 
545 discussion of the validity of these criteria is needed. 
546
547 The way forward
548
549 While there are extensive claims of first-order intentional communication in 
550 other animal species, our current ability to rigorously assess such intentionality is 
551 sadly limited, and we need to look for new alternatives. We provide two main 
552 suggestions for moving forward: (1) directly assessing arousal during 
553 communication, which would allow us to determine the degree to which high levels of 
554 arousal elicit certain signals; and (2) focussing experimentally on second-order 
555 intentionality, as evidence for second-order intentionality implies the existence of 
556 first-order. 
557 It is worth noting that although there are plausible emotional arousal based 
558 explanations for the behavioural criteria for first-order intentional signal production, 
559 few of them are underpinned by hard evidence. Unlike our understanding of 
560 conditioning, which is built on decades of experimental data and theoretical models, 
561 our understanding of how and when arousal affects behaviour is relatively poor. 
562 Despite this, arousal is often offered as a post-hoc explanation for a startlingly wide 
563 array of behaviours and phenomena, and because the tools we have for assessing 
564 arousal are currently inadequate, it is very difficult to rule out arousal accounting for 
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565 interesting behaviours. Yet, because arousal is the lower level of explanation for 
566 behaviour, the onus is on the researcher wanting to claim a higher level mechanism 
567 to rule out the lower level explanation. In most cases this is impossible, because the 
568 current tools for evaluating emotional arousal in primates are inadequate: they are 
569 either prohibitively expensive and work on a timescale incompatible with 
570 understanding individual signal production events (e.g. hormone analysis), require 
571 minimal movement in the animal (thermal imaging), or need expensive specialist 
572 equipment (pupilometry via eyetracking equipment). 
573 Current techniques for measuring dynamic changes in arousal levels are 
574 therefore incompatible with freely-moving, naturally-behaving primates interacting 
575 with one another and, unfortunately, that is the only kind of primate who will produce 
576 the meaningful social signals that we are seeking to understand. This means that 
577 most researchers interested in signal production (including ourselves) have not been 
578 able to address the contribution of arousal to signal production, and have essentially 
579 ignored it. This has led us to the situation in which we currently find ourselves, where 
580 considerable research effort is being invested in trying to establish whether signals 
581 are produced with first-order intentionality, with no certainty that any of our measures 
582 are valid. 
583 Research to produce physiologically validated behavioural measures of 
584 arousal are sorely needed if we are to change this situation, so that we can make 
585 and test differential predictions for patterns of behaviour that would be primarily 
586 arousal driven or intentionally driven. This is not to say that these options are 
587 mutually exclusive; in fact it is likely that arousal plays a complementary role to 
588 intentional processes, as it does in humans, but we need to try and disentangle the 
589 relative contribution of affective arousal and higher cognitive processes on 
590 communicative behaviour.
591 Technological advances allowing us to test signaller arousal, as well as 
592 finding that more distantly related species are meeting criteria for first order 
593 intentionality (e.g. fruit fly courtship behaviour; Shuker, personal communication), 
594 may lead us to conclude that the behavioural criteria for first-order intentionality are 
595 not particularly useful for informing understanding of language evolution. In that 
596 eventuality, we may have to reconsider the virtues of trying to find evidence of 
597 second-order intentional signal production in non-human species. Despite its 
598 disadvantages (12), it may be the best approach we have left. As second-order 
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599 intentional signal production builds on first-order intentional processes (voluntary 
600 goal-directed signal production), if secondorder communication is demonstrated, 
601 this also provides evidence for first-order intentionality, but bypassing the need to 
602 rely on criteria with questionable validity. Second-order intentional signal production 
603 requires attribution of mental states, and this has been most commonly tackled by 
604 looking to see if signal production is mediated by the knowledge state of the 
605 recipient. This is a promising approach, at least in chimpanzees, as there is 
606 convergent evidence from a number of paradigms that chimpanzees understand 
607 what other chimpanzees have seen and know (44, but see 45) and it is clear that 
608 such theory of mind skills are necessary for second-order intentional signal 
609 production (35). Whether the understanding of others mental states influences 
610 signal production is still currently unclear: it has been claimed that chimpanzees are 
611 more likely to alarm call in the presence of individuals that have partial knowledge 
612 rather than full knowledge of a model snake (16), but it is not clear that lower level 
613 behaviour reading explanations have been excluded (47). 
614 What is clear is that further investigations focussed on whether signal 
615 production is mediated by an understanding of others knowledge or ignorance are 
616 likely to focus on the vocal domain. There is good evidence that vocalisations 
617 function to refer to external objects and events, so it is possible to probe whether 
618 these calls are influenced by receivers knowledge of those objects or events. In 
619 contrast, gestures to conspecifics seem to have less potential to be influenced by 
620 knowledge of mental states, as they are predominantly dyadic requests for certain 
621 behaviours from another individual (e.g. give me X; do X; stop that; come here; 
622 (20,21)). There are only a handful of potential cases of triadic gestures that have 
623 ever been observed in wild chimpanzees or bonobos, in many decades of continual 
624 field observations (56,57). In captivity many apes will point for human caretakers, but 
625 these points still seem to share the same imperative motivation as their naturally 
626 occurring gestures, in that they point to request things that they want, but do not 
627 gesture with an informative intention (58), where experimental manipulations of 
628 receiver knowledge could be usefully deployed. Thus, future investigations of 
629 second-order intentional signal production are likely to focus on whether the 
630 knowledge state of listeners mediates the production of functionally referential vocal 
631 signals. And as regards current debates, independently of whether or not it is best to 
632 take a Gricean approach to intentionality (10,11), testing second-order intentionality 
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633 in great apes has the potential to inform us about their capacity for meta-
634 representation and contribute more broadly to the field of animal cognition.
635
636 In conclusion, in order to further our understanding of language evolution it is 
637 vital that we move beyond surface similarities between human language and primate 
638 communication, and search for commonalities and differences in the cognitive 
639 processes driving the production and reception of signals. The degree of intentional 
640 control in non-human signal production is a central and important question, and 
641 although firstorder intentional communication has been widely claimed, the current 
642 tools we have to detect intentional signal production are limited. The validity of the 
643 behavioural criteria for distinguishing first-order from zero-order intentional signal 
644 production is questionable and inconsistency across studies in how and which 
645 intentionality criteria are applied limits comparability. Looking ahead, we need to be 
646 able to detect first-order intentional communication with greater accuracy to 
647 understand how widespread it is in the animal kingdom and what selection pressures 
648 facilitated the evolution of this type of communication. The development of 
649 physiologically validated behavioural measures of arousal is essential if we are to 
650 truly understand the relative contribution of zero-order and first-order intentional 
651 processes to signal production in non-human species. Until those tools are available, 
652 however, productive steps may include individual researchers explicitly 
653 acknowledging the zero-order alternatives to the first-order behavioural markers they 
654 use, and a renewed focus on second-order intentionality in vocalisations produced 
655 by species with established Theory of Mind skills (35).  
656
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Table 1. Studies examining intentional signal production in non-human primates. Papers selected for relevancy from an 
initial search for intentional communication & primate on Web of Science that were published in journal articles from 1980-2018.
Paper Details Empirical details
Author Year Intentionality Criteria used 
Criteria 
explicitly 
tested 
with data
A priori 
criteria 
signals 
met to be 
classed as 
intentional
Order of 
intentionality 
claimed
Type of 
signal Species
Bard 1992 Social use No N/A First Gestural Bornean orangutan
Brockett et al. 2004 Goal-directed No 1/1 First Gestural
Black howler 
monkey
Cartmill & 
Byrne 2010
Social use, Gaze alternation, 
Persistence, Elaboration, Flexible 
use, Response-waiting No
Not 
specified First Gestural
Bornean & 
Sumatran 
orangutans 
Crockford et al. 2012
Calling behaviour modified when 
audience is ignorant vs 
knowledgeable of predator Yes N/A Second Vocal
Eastern 
chimpanzee
Demuru et al. 2015
Social use, Attentional state 
[secondary = eye contact, body 
orientation, response waiting, 
persistence] No
Not 
specified First
Gestural, 
Facial Bonobo
 et al. 2016
Attentional state, Response waiting, 
Persistence, Satisfaction with goal No
Not 
specified First Gestural
Eastern & Western 
chimpanzees
 et al. 2018
Audience checking, Attentional state, 
Persistence No N/A First
Gestural, 
Vocal
Eastern & Western 
chimpanzees
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Genty & Byrne 2010
Social use, Attentional state, 
Persistence, Elaboration No
Not 
specified First Gestural Western gorilla
Genty et al. 2009
Social use, Attentional state, 
Attention-getters, Persistence, 
Elaboration, Flexible use, Response-
waiting No 3/3 First Gestural Western gorilla
Gruber & 
Zuberbühler 2013
Social use, "Checking" (Attentional 
state), Persistence, Response-
waiting Yes N/A First Vocal
Eastern 
chimpanzee
Graham et al. 2018
Attentional state (audience 
checking), Persistence, Response-
waiting No 1/3 First Gestural
Bonobo, Eastern 
chimpanzee
Gupta & Sinha 2016 Persistence No 1/1 First Gestural Bonnet macaque
Halina et al. 2013 Persistence, Satisfaction with goal No 2/2 First Gestural Bonobo
Hobaiter & 
Byrne 2011a
Social use, Attentional state, 
Persistence, Flexible use, Response-
waiting No ¼ First Gestural
Eastern 
chimpanzee
Hobaiter & 
Byrne 2011b
Social use, Attentional state, 
Attention-getters, Persistence, 
Elaboration, Response-waiting No ¼ First Gestural
Eastern 
chimpanzee
Liebal et al. 2004
Social use, Attentional state, 
Attention-getters, Persistence, 
Elaboration, Flexible use No 2/2 First
Gestural, 
Vocal, 
Facial Chimpanzee 
Liebal et al. 2004
Social use, Attentional state, 
Persistence, Elaboration, Flexible 
use, Response-waiting No 2/2 First
Gestural, 
Facial Siamang
Liebal et al. 2006
Social use, Attentional state, 
Persistence, Elaboration, Flexible 
use, Response-waiting No 2/2 First
Gestural, 
Facial
Sumatran 
orangutan
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Roberts et al. 2013 Attentional state No 1/1 First Gestural
Eastern 
chimpanzee
Scheel & 
Edwards
2012 Goal-directed No 1/1 First Gestural Spider monkey
Schel et al. 2013
Social use, Gaze alternation, 
Attentional state (specifically 
audience checking), Persistence Yes N/A Zero & first Vocal
Eastern 
chimpanzee
Sueur & Petit 2010 Flexible use, Goal-directed Yes N/A First
Body 
posture/ 
movements
Tonkean & rhesus 
macaques
Tempelmann & 
Liebal 2012
Social use, Attentional state, 
Attention-getters, Persistence, 
Elaboration No 1/1 First Gestural Orangutan 
Tomasello et 
al. 1985
Social use, Gaze alternation, 
Response-waiting No 1/3 First Gestural Chimpanzee 
Tomasello et 
al. 1994
Social use, Gaze alternation, 
Attentional state, Attention-getters, 
Persistence, Elaboration, Flexible 
use, Response-waiting No
Not 
specified First Gestural Chimpanzee 
Waller et al. 2015 Attentional state No 1/1 First Facial Orangutan
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